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CONFRONTATION IN MASSACHUSETTS: WHAT
"FACE TO FACE"' REALLY MEANS
I. INTRODUCTION

In the 1980's charges of sexual abuse swept the nation.2 Courts
across the country were hearing cases concerning trusted teachers and daycare workers who had been charged with sexually abusing young children.3 Today, the courts are overturning many of the "mass abuse cases"
of the eighties.4
5
One of the most infamous of these cases occurred in Massachusetts.
In 1984, several parents alleged that their children had been abused while
attending the Fells Acres Day School in Malden. 6 Subsequently, Gerald
Amirault was convicted of eight counts of rape of a child and seven counts
of indecent assault and battery on a child.7 His sister, Cheryl LeFave, and

1MASS. CONST. art. XII.
2 See

Malcolm Gladwell, Children's Testimony No Longer Gospel in Day-Care

Abuse Cases, THE WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 3, 1995, at A03 (chronicling many of the

sensational abuse cases of the eighties); see also Review and Outlook, Justice for the
Amiraults, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 30, 1995, at A10 (analyzing the Amirault
case).
3 Dorothy Rabinowitz, Unspeakable Acts, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Oct. 1, 1995, at
128. In 1984, seven teachers at the McMartin School in Manhatten Beach, California, were
charged with 354 allegations of child molestation.
Id. Among those charged were
Raymond Buckey and his mother, Peggy McMartin Buckey. Id. Before their acquittal,
Raymond spent five years in prison and his mother spent two. Id. The original accuser was
revealed to be a paranoid schizophrenic and an alcoholic. Id. In 1988, Kelly Michaels was
convicted of molesting nineteen preschoolers at the Wee Care Day Nursery in Maplewood,
New Jersey. Id. Ms. Michaels spent five years in prison before her conviction was
overturned in 1993 when the court ruled that the children had been guided into making the
accusations. Id. In 1993, Robert F. Kelly, the former co-owner of the Little Rascals daycare center in North Carolina, was sentenced to twelve consecutive life prison terms for
molesting twelve children. Id. The former cook was also convicted of sexual abuse and
sentenced to life in prison. Id. Both convictions were overturned because the judge
allowed the jury to hear highly prejudicial testimony. Id.
4 id.
5 See Dorothy Rabinowitz, A Darkness in Massachusetts I1, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Mar. 14, 1995, at A14 (examining the Amirault case).
See also Dorothy
Rabinowitz, A Darkness in MassachusettsIII, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 12, 1995 at
A12.
6 See Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 620-21, 677 N.E.2d 652, 656
(1997) (chronicling the events prior to the Amirault's conviction). Violet Amirault was the
Director of the Fells Acres Day School. Id. Cheryl LeFave was a teacher at the school and
Gerald Amirault was the bus driver, cook, maintenance man, and general assistant. Id.
Allegations included charges that Gerald Amirault dressed as a clown to entice the children
into sexual acts and that the Amirault's had tortured animals. See Rabinowitz, supra note 3
(describing the Fells Acres case).
7 See id. at 619, 677 N.E.2d at 655 (listing the results of both trials).
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mother, Violet Amirault, were convicted of similar charges. In August of
1995, however, Massachusetts Superior Court Judge Robert A. Barton
overturned the womens' convictions holding that the state had 9denied the
defendants' state constitutional rights to confront their accusers.
Judge Barton based his reasoning on the holding in Commonwealth v.
Johnson.'0 In Johnson, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts outlawed a special seating arrangement used by the prosecution." The seating arrangement had enabled the child witnesses to testify with their backs
to the defendant so that the child was not further traumatized. 2 The Supreme Judicial Court stated this arrangement violated the confrontation3
clause in the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution.'
The same seating arrangement was challenged in the Amirault case.14
This article examines the Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation of
the confrontation clause as outlined in Commonwealth v. Johnson.15 It
also compares Article Twelve of the Massachusetts Constitution with the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. It discusses the Massachusetts confrontation clause, as stated in Article Twelve of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. It also looks at how Massachusetts balances the interests of safeguarding the defendant's right to confront a witness, while simultaneously protecting a child witness from further trauma.
Finally, this article analyzes what steps can be taken in the future to protect
child witnesses in abuse cases without violating the rights of the defendant.

s Id. Cheryl LeFave was convicted of three counts of rape of a child and four counts
of indecent assault and battery on a child. Id. Violet Amirault was convicted of two counts
of rape of a child and three counts of indecent assault and battery on a child. Id at 620, 677
N.E.2d at 655.
9 MASS. CONST. art. XII. See Review and Outlook, supra note 2 (chronicling the
events leading up to the release of the Amirault's). In 1997, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts reinstated the convictions of Violet Amirault and Cheryl LeFave, however, it
was not disputed that the women were denied the constitutional right to confront their
accusers. See William F. Doherty, Psychology Professor Cross Examined on Fells Acres
Testimony, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 19, 1988, at B2; see also Amirault, 424 Mass. at 632,
677 N.E.2d at 662 (confirming that the Amirault's constitutional rights were violated).
Following the ruling by the Supreme Judicial Court, Amirault and LeFave were granted a
new trial because their lawyer did not object to the seating arrangement. Id.
'0 417 Mass. 498, 631 N.E.2d 1002 (1994).
IId. at 499-500, 631 N.E.2d at 1004.
12Id. at 499-500, 631 N.E.2d at 1004-05.
13Id. at 499-500, 631 N.E.2d at 1004.
14See Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 621-22, 677 N.E.2d 652, 656-657
(1997) (describing the seating arrangement).
15Johnson, 417 Mass. at 499-505, 631 N.E.2d at 1004-07.
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II. CASE IN CHIEF

In Commonwealth v. Johnson, James E. Johnson was convicted of two
counts of rape by force of a child under the age of sixteen.' 6 The victims
in the case were the two minor daughters of Johnson's girlfriend.' 7 Johnson was sentenced to concurrent nine to ten year prison terms on each indictment.' 8
Prior to trial, the judge heard arguments by the Commonwealth requesting an unusual courtroom seating arrangement. 19 The Judge allowed
the motion for the special seating arrangement despite objections from the
defense. 20 The defense claimed the seating arrangement violated the defendant's right to confront a witness against him as required by the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article
Twelve of the Declaration of Rights in the Massachusetts Constitution. 2'
The seating arrangement allowed the child witness to testify facing
the jury with her back to the defendant. 22 The witness sat in a chair near
the court reporter's table, facing the jury, while the attorney asking questions sat between the jury and the witness. 23 As a result of the seating arrangement, the defendant could not see the face of the witness. 24
On appeal, the case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court on
its own initiative. 25 In a decision written by Chief Justice Liacos, the court
held that Article Twelve "contains an indispensable element of face to face

Id. (holding Johnson was in violation of MASS. GEN. LAWS ch 265 § 22A (1992)).
17Id. Johnson's girlfriend, the mother of the two children, was indicted and convicted
16

for being an accessory to rape after the fact. Id. at n.l. Her trial was consolidated with

Johnson's, but she was not a party to the appeal. Id.
18Commonwealth v. Johnson, 417 Mass. 498, 499, 631 N.E.2d 1002, 1004 (1994).
'9Id. at 500, 631 N.E.2d at 1004.
20 Id. at 500-01, 631 N.E.2d at 1004-05. The Judge allowed the seating arrangement
without hearing any evidence regarding the necessity of the arrangement and without

making any specific findings of the needs of the individual witnesses. Id. The Judge stated
that the ages of the witnesses lead him to his decision. Id. at 501 n.2, 631 N.E.2d at 1005
n.2. He also examined the defense's motion regarding the two children's reservations about
testifying before the defendant. Id. at 500-01 n.2, 631 N.E.2d at 1005 n.2.

21See id., at 500-01 & n.3, 631 N.E.2d at 1004-05 & n.3 (outlining the defense's
argument and details of the special seating arrangement); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (asserting
the right to confront a witness). See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. (asserting that the bill
of rights applies to the states). See also MASS. CONST. art. XII (granting the right to face to
face confrontation in Massachusetts).
22 Johnson, 417 Mass. at 500, 631 N.E.2d at 1005.
23

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 417 Mass 498, 500, 631 N.E.2d 1002, 1005 (1994).

24

id.

25 Id. at 499, 631 N.E.2d at 1002.
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confrontation of witnesses appearing at trial," therefore, the seating arrangement violated the defendant's constitutional rights.26
III. RATIONALE BEHIND THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution grants the
criminal defendant the fundamental right to confront any and all witnesses.27 Article Twelve of the Massachusetts Constitution also guarantees the right to confront one's accusers. 28 The rationale behind the confrontation clause is to promote the truth and veracity of the witness. 29 It is
generally accepted that a witness is less likely to lie if he is forced to swear
under oath to tell the truth, testify in a courtroom, and testify in front of the
defendant. 30 Face to face confrontation enables the jury to assess the
credibility of the witness. 3' It is a widely held belief that confrontation is
especially important in cases involving sexual abuse and rape, because oftentimes it is one person's word against another's. 32 The right to confront
gives the defendant the opportunity to observe the witness; however, it
does not require the witness to actually look at the defendant. 33 In addiId. at 503-04, 631 N.E.2d at 1006.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI which states in pertinent part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witness againsthim; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense. Id. (emphasis added)
28 MASS. CONST. art. XII. Article Twelve states in pertinent part: "every subject shall
have a right to produce all proofs, that may be favorable to him; to meet the witness against
him face to face, and to be fully heard in his defense by himself, or his counsel at his
election." Id. (emphasis added).
29 See Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 541-42, 524 N.E.2d 366, 371
(1988) (noting that confrontation likely encourages truthfulness in a witness); see also
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 423 Mass. 591, 596-97, 670 N.E.2d 377, 381 (1996) (assessing
whether allowing a child witness to testify at a table frustrated the purpose of the
confrontation clause); United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979)
(acknowledging that confrontation significantly affects "recollection, veracity and
communication").
30 Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at 541-42, 524 N.E.2d at
371.
31See id. at 542-43, 524 N.E.2d at 372 (stating the significance of the right to
physical confrontation); see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019-23 (1988) (holding that
a screen placed between the defendant and the witness defeated the purpose of the right to
confront and violated the Constitution); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43
(1895) (outlining the core values behind the confrontation clause).
32 See Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222, 229, 415 N.E.2d 181, 186
(1981)
(stating that the right to cross examine in a rape case may be the last chance for the
defendant to present a defense); see also Sanchez, 423 Mass. at 596-97, 670 N.E.2d at 38081 (noting the importance of allowing the jury to assess the demeanor of a child witness);
Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at 550, 524 N.E.2d at 376 (finding that videotaped testimony did not
afford the jury the chance to adequately observe the child witness in a child rape case).
33 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kater, 409 Mass. 433, 446, 567 N.E.2d 885, 892-93
26

27
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tion, the trial judge has
discretion to alter the proceedings to accommodate
34
witness.
a particular
IV. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant the right to cross examine witnesses. 35 This right is limited by the traditional hearsay exceptions involving an unavailable witness who was already subject to cross
examination. 36

In Coy v. Iowa,37 the Supreme Court held that the trial

court had violated the defendant's right to confrontation when a screen was
placed between the witness and the defendant. 38 During testimony the defendant could barely see the witness and the witness could not see the defendant at all. 39 Chronicling the history of the right to confront, the Supreme Court held that face to face confrontation was at the "core of the
values furthered by the confrontation clause," but stopped short of making
face to face confrontation mandatory. 40 The court left open the possibility
of an exception.4 '
Thereafter, in the landmark case of Maryland v. Craig,4z the United
States Supreme Court noted that face to face confrontation was always
(1991) (holding defendant's right to confrontation was not violated when witness refused to
look at the defendant); Commonwealth v. Conefry, 410 Mass. 1, 14, 570 N.E.2d 1384, 1391
(1991) (noting the witness had the right to avoid eye contact and that the defendant's ability
to see the witness' profile was sufficient to satisfy the confrontation clause); Commonwealth
v. Tufts, 405 Mass. 610, 614-16, 542 N.E.2d 586, 589-90 (1989) (holding a defendant's
confrontation rights were not violated when he could see the witness by bending slightly);
see also Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 230 (Ky. 1986) (holding that the
Kentucky constitution does not guarantee "eyeball to eyeball" confrontation).
34See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 423 Mass. 591, 597, 670 N.E.2d 377, 381 (1996)
(upholding judge's decision to allow child witness to testify at small table instead of the
witness box). In Sanchez, the defendant was accused of sexually abusing a child under the
age of sixteen. Id. at 592, 670 N.E.2d at 378. The Judge allowed the witness to sit at a
table during testimony with the attorney asking the questions at the table with her. Id. at
595-96, 670 N.E.2d at 380.
35U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
36 See United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding that
videotaped testimony prepared without the defendant's involvement violated the
defendant's right to confrontation). See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974)
(holding refusal to allow the defendant to cross-examine a key witness violated his
constitutional right to confront); Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020-22 (1988) (finding a screen placed
between
37 the witness and the defendant violated the defendant's rights to confrontation).
"Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
" Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020-22.
39Id. at 1015.
' Id. 487 U.S. at 10 15-22. The court traced the right to confront back to Roman law.
id. at 1015-16.
41See Id., at 1020 (noting the possibility of an exception to the confrontation clause to
further an important public policy).
42 497 U.S. 836 (1990). In Craig, the defendant had been convicted of sexual assault
and battery of a child. Id. at 840. The judge allowed the six year old witness to testify via
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preferable, but in limited circumstances an exception may be made.43 The
Court held that the state's compelling interest in protecting the well-being
of a child witness sufficiently justified an exception to the confrontation
clause."4 The Court allowed a child witness to testify via one-way closed
circuit television after a case specific determination of necessity.45 After
Craig, individual states had to determine whether their state constitutions
would allow this type of exception to the confrontation clause or whether
actual face to face confrontation was essential.
V. ARTICLE TWELVE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION

The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts wasthe first
state constitution to explicitly guarantee a defendant the right to meet his
accuser "face to face".
In Commonwealth v. Bergstom, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts distinguished Article Twelve of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights from the United States Constitution by
stating that the phrases "to meet" and "face to face," as used in the Massachusetts Constitution, required more than simply allowing the defendant to
see and hear the witness. Consequently, the court held that the testimony
via one-way closed-circuit television in this case violated the defendant's
rights under Article Twelve. 49 The court's decision acknowledged exceptions to face to face confrontation, but limited them to the traditional hearsay exceptions and to situations involving "unique interests. 5 °
closed-circuit television after determining that the child would suffer emotional trauma if
forced to testify in the courtroom in front of the defendant. Id. at 843. The child, the
prosecutor, and the defense attorney were in one room while the judge, the defendant, and
the jury were in another room. Id. at 841. The defendant was always in communication
with his attorney. Id. at 842.
43 Id. at 847. The Court held that the confrontation clause may be satisfied without
face to face confrontation if necessary to further some important public policy and an indicia
of reliability exists. Id. at 847-50. The Court also specifically stated that a state's interest in
protecting minor victims of abuse may outweigh a defendant's right to confront his accuser.
Id. at 853.
44 Id. at 853.
41

Id. at 855-56.

46 Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 542 n.9, 524 N.E.2d 366, 371 n.9
(1988). See also MASS. CONST. art. XII (articulating the defendant's right to confront); see

supra note 29 (quoting Article Twelve of the Massachusetts constitution).
47 Bergstrom. 402 Mass. at 535, 524 N.E.2d at 367.
48 See id. at 551-54, 524 N.E.2d at 377-78 (holding the use of testimony by closedcircuit television outside the presence of the defendant violated Article Twelve). Bergstrom
was charged with raping his minor daughters. Id. at 535, 524 N.E.2d at 367. On appeal he
claimed that his state constitutional rights were violated when his daughters were permitted
to testify on video outside of his presence. Id. at 540, 524 N.E.2d at 370.
49 Id. at 547, 524 N.E.2d at 374.
'0 Id. at 545, 524 N.E.2d at 373. See also Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 385 Mass.
733, 742-43, 434 N.E.2d 163, 169 (1982) (holding that prior testimony by an unavailable
witness is admissible if it has an indicia of reliability); Commonwealth v. DiPietro, 373
Mass. 369, 379-80, 367 N.E.2d 811, 818 (1977) (allowing admission of previous testimony

1998]

SCOPE OF RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts follows the traditional
guidelines of constitutional construction holding that the language used in
the constitution is to be "interpreted in a sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its adoption." 5' Every word is presumed
to have been chosen for a reason and no words are ignored or held to be
meaningless.52 The court presumes that the framers of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights, read previously adopted state constitutions before
drafting the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 53 Therefore, any differences between the Massachusetts Constitution and constitutions previously
adopted are considered to be purposeful 5 4
In Johnson, the Supreme Judicial Court went further 6than it did in
Bergstrom and held that face to face confrontation of a witness was mandatory under Article Twelve. 55 The court paid special attention to the fact
that the framers chose to use the words "face to face., 56 This directly
contradicted the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment

by defendant's wife after her assertion of the marital privilege); Commonwealth v. Slavski,
245 Mass. 405, 416, 140 N.E.2d 465, 468 (1923) (recognizing the public record exception
to face to face confrontation). See also Murphy v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst.,
Cedar Junction, 396 Mass. 830, 832, 489 N.E.2d 661, 663 (1986) (finding prison inmates
do not have the right to confront fellow inmates in prison disciplinary proceedings);
Commonwealth v. Pennellatore, 392 Mass. 382, 388-90, 467 N.E.2d 820, 824-25 (1984)
(holding witness' right against self incrimination is paramount to defendant's right to
confrontation). The Supreme Court, however, in Maryland v. Craig stated that an important
public policy may call for an exception to the confrontation clause. Craig, 497 U.S. at 837.
See supra note 44 (outlining the holding in Maryland v. Craig).
5'See Attorney General ex rel. Mann v. City of Methuen, 236 Mass. 564, 572-73, 129
N.E. 662, 664-65 (1921) (stating that a constitutional amendment must be interpreted as the
words were commonly understood at adoption). See also Opinion of the Justices, 365
Mass. 655, 657, 311 N.E.2d 44, 45 (1974) (holding that constitutional language must be
interpreted so that all those entitled to vote may understand); Lincoln v. Secretary of the
Commonwealth, 326 Mass. 313, 317, 93 N.E.2d 744, 747 (1950) (interpreting
constitutional requirements for an initiative petition); Yont v. Secretary of the
Commonwealth, 275 Mass. 365, 366-67, 176 N.E. 1, 2 (1931) (applying a constitutional
amendment regulating the use of a referendum petition); Raymer v. Trefry, 239 Mass. 410,
412, 132 N.E. 190, 191 (1921) (interpreting a constitutional amendment regarding income
taxes).
52 See Town of Mt. Washington v. Cook, 288 Mass. 67, 70, 192 N.E. 464, 465 (1934)
(interpreting a constitutional amendment regarding procedures required to file a
referendum); Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass. 769, 777, 126 N.E.2d 795, 800 (1955)
(analyzing the meaning of Article Ten of the Declaration of Rights).
3 Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 541, 524 N.E.2d 366, 371 (1988)
(quoting Larkin, The Right of Confrontation: What's Next?, 1 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 67, 7576) (1969).
" Id. at 541, 524 N.E.2d at 371. Many previously adopted state constitutions merely
used the words "to be confronted with" or "to confront", while the framers of the
Massachusetts Constitution were the first to explicitly state that the defendant had the right
to "meet a witness against him face to face". Id. at 541, 524 N.E.2d at 371.
55 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 417 Mass. 498, 503, 631 N.E.2d 1002, 1006 (1994).
56 Id. at 502, 631 N.E.2d at 1005.
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as stated in Craig.57 Again, the Supreme Judicial Court noted the exceptions that it outlined in Bergstrom and held that beyond these limited exceptions, the defendant's right to confront is superior to all other considerations. 58
VI. OTHER JURISDICTIONS

The state constitutions of some other jurisdictions specifically mandate face to face confrontation. 59 For example, in Commonwealth v.
Louden,60 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that statutes allowing
testimony via closed-circuit television and the admission of videotaped
depositions violated the defendant's state constitutional rights. 6' The court
acknowledged that the United States Constitution preferred face to face
confrontation, but held that the Pennsylvania State constitution dictated
face to face confrontation. 62
Other state constitutions that are not as explicit allow testimony by
children that is not actually face to face. 6 3 For example, Connecticut's
57Compare Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990) ("[a]lthough face to face
confrontation forms the 'core of the values furthered by the confrontation clause' we have
nevertheless recognized that it is not the sine qua non of the confrontation rights") with
Johnson, 417 Mass. at 503, 631 N.E.2d at 1006 ("[Article Twelve] contains an
indispensable element of confrontation of witnesses appearing at trial").
58Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 545-46, 524 N.E.2d 366, 373-74
(1988). See Commonwealth v. Elliot, 393 Mass. 824, 828, 473 N.E.2d 1121 (1985)
(finding that judges' rulings limiting cross-examination of rape victim violated defendant's
right to confront). See also Commonwealth v. Ferrara, 368 Mass. 182, 183-90, 330 N.E.2d
837, 839-43 (1975) (holding denying defendant access to juvenile record of witness also
deprived him of his constitutional right to confront the witness against him).
59See People v. Fitzpatrick, 158 Ill.2d 360, 367-68, 633 N.E.2d 685, 688-89 (I11.
1994) (holding that alleged victim's testimony via close-circuit television violated state
constitutional right to "face to face" confrontation). The Illinois Constitution states: "In
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to ...meet the witness face to face.
" ILL....
CONST. art. I, § 8. See also State v. Owings, 622 N.E.2d 948, 950-51 (Ind. 1993)
(stating the state constitution is different than Sixth Amendment and requiring face to face
meeting). The Indiana Constitution states in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall have the right to... meet the witness face to face ....
" IND. CONST., art.
I, § 13. See generally James G. Fenian, Developments in State ConstitutionalLaw: 1994,
Criminal Procedure-Defendant's Rights, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 1130, 1141-49 (Summer 1995)
(analyzing both state and federal rights to confront a witness).
60 536 Pa. 180, 638 A.2d 953 (1994).
61See Louden, 536 Pa. at 188, 638 A.2d at 957. On appeal, the defendant challenged
the constitutionality of allowing child victims to testify through videotaped depositions. id.
at 186-88, 638 A.2d at 956-57. Article I, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states in
pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right ... to be confronted
with the witness against him ....PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
61 Id., at 186-88, 638 A.2d at 956-57.
63 See N.Y. CONST. art. 1,§ 6. (granting the defendant's right to confront his accuser).
Article One of the New York Constitution states in pertinent part: "In any trial in any court
whatever the party the accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with
counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
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constitution simply states that a defendant has a right to "be confronted by
the witness against him." 64 In State v. Jarzbeck, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut held that a child witness, who has allegedly been the victim of
child abuse, may testify by closed-circuit television, if there is a compelling need. 66 In its decision, the court did not completely disregard the defendant's right to face to face confrontation, but simply recognized the defendant's right was not absolute and was subject to some exceptions.6 7
Specifically, the court authorized videotaped testimony outside the presence of the defendant in cases involving the sexual abuse of young children.68
The language adopted by a state's constitution, however, is not entirely indicative of how the state will rule with respect to the right to face
to face confrontation. 69 For example, the Kentucky State Constitution
guarantees "face to face" confrontation,7" but in Commonwealth v. Willis, 71 the Supreme Court of Kentucky allowed the use of one-way closedcircuit television testimony.72 Noting that the framers of the constitution
could not have foreseen the technological advances facilitating this type of

and be confronted with the witness against him .
ld. See also People v. Guce, 560
I..."
N.Y.S.2d 53, 56-57, 164 A.D.2d 946, 947-49 (1990) (holding child witness declared a
vulnerable witness could testify via two-way closed-circuit television). See also People v.
Tuck, 537 N.Y.S.2d 355, 356, 147 A.D.2d 899 (1989) (upholding conviction where seven
year old witness testified at a table facing the jury). The North Carolina Constitution states
a defendant has the right "to confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony."
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 23. See also In the Matter of Johnny Stradford, 119 N.C. App. 654,
660-61, 460 S.E.2d 173, 177 (1995)(allowing a child witness to testify against her alleged
abuser via closed-circuit television). See also Merideth Felice Sopher, "The Best of all
Possible Worlds": Balancing Victim's and Defendants' Rights In the Child Sexual Abuse
Case, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 644 n.120(listing 26 states that statutorily allowed testimony via
closed-circuit television in sexual abuse cases).
64 CONN. CONsT. art. 1, § 8.
65 204 Conn. 683, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987).
66 Id. at 707, 529 A.2d at 1256.
67 Id. at 693, 529 A.2d at 1250.
68 Id. at 707, 529 A.2d at 1256.
69 See N.H. CONST. Pt. 1,art. 15, which states in pertinent part: "Every.subject shall
have a right to produce all proofs that may be favorable to himself; to meet the witnesses
against him face to face, and to be fully heard in his defense, by himself and counsel." See
also State v. Peters, 133 N.H. 791, 794, 587 A.2d 587, 588-89 (1991) (holding that the
defendant's right to face to face confrontation may yield under public policy
considerations).
70 Ky. CONST. § 11. The Kentucky Constitution states in pertinent part: "In all
criminal prosecutions the accused has the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him; to meet the witness face to face,
and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor" Id. (emphasis added).
71 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986).
72 Id. at 226. This case involved the testimony of a five year old victim of sexual
abuse. Id. The defendant could see and hear the child witness, but the child witness could
not see the defendant. Id.
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testimony, the court held that the defendant did not have the right to force
the victim to look at him.73
VII. THE JOHNSON COURT'S REASONING
In Commonwealth v. Johnson,74 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts specifically concentrated on Article Twelve of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.75 The Supreme Judicial Court noted that the
framers of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights had the opportunity to
refer to other state constitutions. 76 The court acknowledged that many of
these constitutions did not contain a clause calling for face to face confrontation.77 Despite this, the court noted, the framers of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights chose to include this explicit and specific language. 78
The Supreme Judicial Court realized that they could not simply ignore
the language of the Declaration of Rights, but had to look at the words
chosen and interpret them the only way possible.7 9 In so doing, the court
declared that the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights required the defendant and the witness to be actually face to face. s°
The court, however, limited the face to face requirement.81 The Supreme Judicial Court stated that although the witness must be face to face
with the defendant, the witness does not have to actually look at the defen3
dant.82 A judge cannot force a witness to look the defendant in the eye.
The court in Johnson also addresses the differences between the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article Twelve of the
Massachusetts Constitution.84 The court noted that like the Sixth Amendment, Article Twelve would be subject to some necessary exceptions. 85
73 Id. at 230. The court stated that this method of testimony furthered the goals of the
confrontation clause because it furthered the truth seeking process. Id. In addition, the
right to confront does not mean the right to intimidate, and since the defendant could not
force the witness to look at him, there was nothing constitutionally infirm about this method
of testimony. Id. at 231. The court points out that if there was a requirement to look at the
defendant, a blind person would not be eligible to testify in court. Id.
74 417 Mass. 498, 631 N.E.2d 1002 (1994).
" Id. at 501, 631 N.E.2d at 1005.
76 Id., 631 N.E.2d at 1005.
77 Id., 631 N.E.2d at 1005.
"s Id., 631 N.E.2d at 1005.
79 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 417 Mass, 498, 501-02, 631 N.E.2d 1002, 1005-06
(1994).
'0 Id. at 502-05, 631 N.E.2d at 1005-08.
s Id. at 502-03, 631 N.E.2d at 1005-06.
82 Id. at 502, 631 N.E.2d at 1006.
83 Id., 631 N.E.2d at 1006.
84 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 417 Mass, 498, 503, 631 N.E.2d 1002, 1006 (1994).
85 Id. at 503-04, 631 N.E.2d at 1006.
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Under the Sixth Amendment, however, the defendant's rights could be altered if there was a compelling state interest, but Article Twelve mandated
face to face confrontation. 6
At the end of the analysis, the court emphasized its sympathy for the
young victims of child abuse. 7 Even though the court recognized the need
to protect victims it stresses that the protection cannot come at the expense
of the defendant's fundamental right to confrontation.88 The court pointed
out that some other accommodations may be made to help the child witness if there is proof of a compelling need. 9
VIII. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Johnson
has had a major impact on cases involving the abuse of young children. a0
The question is whether the Supreme Judicial Court was justified in denying children the opportunity to testify without facing the alleged abuser.
The analysis of the Supreme Judicial Court in Johnson was clear and
concise. 9' The court interpreted the words used in Article Twelve literally. 92 The court placed significant weight on the fact that the framers
specifically altered the language used in the United States Constitution and
other previously adopted state constitutions.93 The court held that the
framers chose clear and unambiguous language, therefore, it was not
within their power to alter their meaning. 94 The court sent a message that
they were not willing to alter their strict interpretation of the Massachusetts Constitution no matter how compelling the reason. 95 The Supreme
Judicial Court compared Article Twelve to the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution." The court made the logical conclusion that
86

Id. at 503, 631 N.E.2d at 1006.

87 Id. at 504, 631 N.E.2d at 1007.
88 Id.

89 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 417 Mass, 498, 504, 631 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (1994).
Among accommodations mentioned by the court were: counseling before and after
testimony, making the environment in which the child testifies less formal, and allowing the
child to testify sitting at a forty-five degree angle from the defendant. Id.
90 See generally Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 677 N.E.2d 652
(holding that the defendant's constitutional rights were violated).
91See supra notes 51-58 (discussing the guidelines of constitutional interpretation
followed by the Supreme Judicial Court).
92 See supra note 5i (addressing the requirement of interpreting words by their plain
meaning).
93 See supra note 54 (acknowledging that other constitutions simply require
confrontation rather than face to face confrontation).
94 id.
95 See supra note 49 (noting that face to face confrontation is essential under Article
Twelve of the Massachusetts Constitution).
96 See supra notes 39-58 (outlining the differences between the Sixth Amendment and
Article Twelve).
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the Sixth Amendment provides the leeway to allow an exception to the
confrontation clause that Article Twelve does not provide.97 The court
properly followed a strict interpretation of the Massachusetts Constitution
rather than alter its analysis to keep up with modem trends.
After Johnson, prosecutors are left with the question of how to protect
child witnesses from the trauma of testifying. The Supreme Judicial Court
clearly stated that they sympathized with these children and that accommodations must be made to assist them in the courtroom.9 8
IX. CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that Massachusetts is one of the strictest states with
respect to the confrontation clause, the children have not been forgotten.
Other steps can be taken to help protect the children and reduce any
trauma. For example the witness cannot be forced to look at the defendant.99 Defendants must be able to see the expression of the witness, but
this does not mean that are afforded the right to intimidate the witness.' °
Upon a showing of necessity, a prosecutor may have the witness testify at
an angle so that the witness is less likely to look at the defendant.' 0 2' In
addition, a judge is free to alter the environment to cater to the child.'
The Supreme Judicial Court correctly chose to secure a defendant's
constitutional rights by mandating face to face confrontation. Child abuse
is a horrid crime, however, the courts cannot let the hysteria of the moment
affect its decisions. The court's decision is necessary to ensure that an innocent defendant will not be wrongly convicted.
Lisa Donahue

97 See supra note 58 (comparing the Sixth Amendment with Article Twelve).
98 Commonwealth

v. Johnson, 417 Mass. 498, 504, 631 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (1994).

99 See supra note 35 (discussing the limitations of the impact of the confrontation
clause on the witness).
1oo Id.
101Id.
102 Id. One of the best examples is allowing a child to testify at a small table and
having the attorneys sit at the table with the child during questioning. See supra note 38
(reviewing the decision by a judge to allow a child to testify at a small table).

